Sports Management Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Sports Management - Essay Example This paper tells that countries have made teams of popular sports and each has their own representative in each respective sport. It has become a multimillion-dollar industry, to say the least (Aaron Smith and Bob Stewart, 1999). Sports like football and formula one are followed more regularly and enjoyed more by people that their religious festivals. Obviously, this means that things have become much more complex. Who will manage the team for instance Who will select the team in the first place from the thousands of talented individuals who have turned to give trials All this calls for some form of organization and proper management of sports. This is where sports management comes in. It is basically there too, well, manage sports. More specifically, this looks at sports from a more business point of view. How can you cash in on sports How to promote certain kinds of sports in the best way possible and which sports to stop chasing because they are just not worth spending a fortune o n? Entering into this field has many options to choose from. You can become a sports agent, who will basically provide you and your team opportunities to come on the stage and prove your worth. From there on then the whole thing will be your own talent. You can go on to become a sports manager, who in a nutshell will manage your team making sure that no member harms the team in any way such as getting caught in match-fixing and so on. If you are good with words then you can become a publicist where you can publicize the team and make it sound better than they really are, in many cases.

Qualitative Research Problem and Design Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1500 words

Qualitative Research Problem and Design - Essay Example The main methods for collecting qualitative data include individual interviews, focus groups, observations and action research. Many factors were considered in deciding the appropriate research methodology. A qualitative approach is effective in solving the problem in this case because it can create new theories. As the researcher attempts to understand the topic, he or she will have to interact with the participants. In addition, the researcher will have to study existing information about the topic. The practice may lead to the discovery of a new theory. Qualitative research is important when addressing a new phenomenon in the society or examining an important issue in the country (Jamshed, 2014). The possibility of discovering a new theory is important because it could result in a better understanding of student performance in mathematical subjects. In addition, qualitative analysis is likely to explain the relationship between things and demonstrate their effect in that situation. As a result, it contributes towards the development of a better understanding of the issue. Furthermore, the method is characterized by observation or reading information. The researcher is expected to respond to the insights learned from this approach through writing. Consequently, it contributes towards the growth of the existing body of knowledge about a topic. Qualitative research is based on a theoretical framework (Bendassoli, 2013). As a result, it shall be addressing an important issue in the society that is important for the well-being of the society. Addressing the high failure rates will enable the country to enhance its competitiveness. Furthermore, qualitative research is flexible. Instead of applying a rigidly defined framework, research method and data collection style, a flexible approach is important in developing a holistic understanding of an issue. The method involves the collection of data using observational

Pearl River Piano Company Essay Example for Free

Pearl River Piano Company Essay Pearl River Piano Group (PRPG) was established in 1956 by bringing together six small piano shops in Guangzhou. The group of 100 employees produced only 13 pianos that year. After many attempts, Guangzhou technicians were finally satisfied with the tone color and quality of its first manufactured piano, and in a short time it was sold in Hong Kong. It would be twenty years before the factory was able to prove its potential. As a State -owned enterprise PRPG is accountable to the Guangzhou municipal government. Investments from both Yamaha and Steinway Sons have played a key role in the expansion of their production. In addition, PRPG has bought the German piano brand Ritmuller and will be expanding in the European market. Guangzhou, located at the north of the Pearl River delta, is an important trading center as well as a busy port and the capital city of the province of Guandong . The city has an area of over 16,000 square kilometers and a population of 6.7 million. Guangzhou is also one of the most important centers of foreign commerce in South China. There are a lot of interesting legends concerning its past. One of the beautiful stories which gives the city its name Goat Town says that five gods riding on five goats brought the first grain to the city. In 1959 PRPG consisted of a shed on the side of the street to repair pianos. Later a shelter was built to process the wood. At that time the pianos were carried in a cart with men walking barefoot to the port. During the tumultuous of Mao Zedongs Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s, few Chinese dared to buy a piano, which symbolized the Wests decadent and bourgeois society. Learning the piano was frowned upon at that time. The factory didnt stop making pianos. However, they were lucky if they sold more than one hundred pianos a year. In the meantime Chinas one-child policy has created a culture where parents invest heavily in their childrens education. Parents like to spend money to improve their childrens education and culture and this has paid off for PRPG. Nearly 80%of their pianos are sold in China. Pianos have caught on in China. PRPGs domestic shipments climbed even throughout Asias financial crisis. During the1960s companies such as Yamaha took advantage of low labor costs to enter the global and domestic market. They were quietly followed my South Korea. For years the musical instrument business was dominated by U.S. and European companies. But this has been changing now for decades. In 1992 Tong Zhi Cheng took control of the company. He had worked for only one company during his adult life, the state-owned PRPG. When Tong took over pianos were fairly common in households in Europe and the U.S. for nearly two centuries, but in China they have been a luxury. In 1995 PRPG and Yamaha Pianos of Japan forged a $10 million joint venture. They set up a company called Yamaha-Pearl River. This company was set up to make certain Eterna models that are exported to Europe and the USA. Unlike Chinas typically backward state-owned companies, PRPG is savvy about brands and looks for new products to sell. Tong bought a mature German brand Ritmà ¼ller in 1999. In addition he has struck a deal with Steinway Sons to produce their Essex line of pianos. Today, PRPG consists of a factory spanning 2 million square feetthe worlds biggest piano plantcranks out 250 pianos every day. White-smocked workers steer computer-driven kilns that bake oak planks en masse. Individual piano keys are hand-checked for precision and balance. Five pairs of ears listen to each pianos tuning, speeding another instrument out the doorand into Americas living rooms. Just two years after Pearl River set up a U.S. sales arm, its high- quality, low-priced pianos have snared 10% of the market, and the company vows to capture a 25% share by 2005. It already has won the hearts and minds of some U.S. consumers.

American Intelligence In The Cuban Missile Crisis History Essay

American Intelligence In The Cuban Missile Crisis History Essay The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 brought the world close to a nuclear confrontation between the United States, Cuba, and the Soviet Union. The Cuban missile crisis was triggered by the Soviet deployment to Cuba of medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. It was the result of a variety of things: the Cuban Revolution, the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, US anti-communism, the insecurity of the Soviet Union, and Cubas fear of invasion. From the start of the crisis, American intelligence monitored the islands development and was able to collect and analyze information, but it miscalculated the Soviet Unions intentions and motivation for placing nuclear missiles in Cuba. American intelligence, through human intelligence gathering methods, aerial photoreconnaissance, and signal interceptions, was able to discover Soviet missiles in Cuba, and thwart the possibility of a nuclear war. This intelligence provided the U.S with a great deal of in formation about its enemies military units, missiles, weapons and strength. The events of the Cuban Missile Crisis revealed the sophistication of the U.S. intelligence community, especially in its ability to collect and analyze information. Human Intelligence (HUMIT) obtained inside information concerning Cuba from Refugees, and important secrets transferred to U.S. Government by Soviet Colonel Oleg Penkovsky. Photographic intelligence (PHOTINT) played an exceedingly important part (the U-2 reconnaissance spy-plane) in taking internal terrestrial images of the Island. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) was used to block communication between Soviet Union and Cubans during the crisis to the advantage of the Americans. Cuban Missile Crisis Background Fidel Castro came to power after the Cuban Revolution. At first the U.S. supported Castro, but when he embraced communism, the U.S. attempted to overthrow Castros rule in Cuba. In April 1961, Americans used CIA-trained and armed Cuban exiles (La Brigada) in the Bay of Pigs invasion but failed. After the failed invasion of the Bay of Pigs, it was evident to the Castro that the U.S. would attack again, causing him to make concessions with the Soviet Union in order to defend Cuba. Consequently, Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev eagerly extended an offer of assistance to the desperate Castro and saw an opportunity to gain a strategic foothold in Americas backyard. Castro allowed the Soviet Union to place military bases on the island of Cuba, in exchange for protection against any U.S. invasion attempts. After Castros approval, Khrushchev quickly and secretly built ballistic missile installations in Cuba in the summer of 1962. When the U.S discovered ballistic missiles presence in Cuba, it elevated tension between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. When the missiles installation were discovered by intelligence, President John F. Kennedy ordered a naval quarantine (blockade) of Cuba and threatened to invade Cuba; as a result, the Soviet Union pledged to withdraw from Cuba if the U.S. did not invade and finally the Cuban Missile Crisis was resolved. The American Intelligence Role in the Pre-Cuban Missile Crisis The Cuban missile crisis started in a series of American intelligence blunders that started under the Dwight Eisenhower administration and continued into the John F. Kennedy administration. The American intelligence agency devised Operation Mongoose, which was aimed to expel the powerful Castro and his regime. The Operation Mongoose plot included economic and political destabilization, propaganda, manipulation, sabotage, assignation plots and direct assistance to anti-Castro Cubans in military training. During the Cold war, Cuban refugees provided inaccurate inside information about Cuba and Castro, and such information was able to convince the Americas Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to initiate the covert Bay of Pigs operation on April 17th, 1961 to overthrow the Castro communist regime. Cuban exiles, trained by the CIA, staged a botched invasion at Cubas Bay of Pigs, but the CIAs planned invasion ended in complete failure due to miscalculations by the CIA and a lack of resources and support from the American military. U.S. intelligence misunderstood the nature of Fidel Castros insurgency and miscalculated the likelihood of his victory. Operation Mongoose (Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba is a part of this operation) is also partially responsible for initiating the Cuban Missile Crisis as Cuban intelligence was able to discover that America planned to assassinate Castro through Operation Mongoose. Castro was worried about Cubas safety; on the other side, the Soviet Union was also worried about losing a valuable ally in Cuba. Moreover, the Soviets had the intention to compensate for Soviet inferiority in ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missile) and liked to reply to the Americans with a nuclear version of tit-for-tat as noted by Khrushchevs advisor Fyodor Burlatsky: Khrushchev and Soviet Defence Minister R. Malinovsky à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦ were strolling along the Black Sea coast. Malinovsky pointed out to sea and said that on the other shore in Turkey there was an American nuclear missile base. In a matter of six or seven minutes missiles launched from that base could devastate major centres in the Ukraine and southern Russ ia. à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦ Khrushchev asked Malinovsky why the Soviet Union should not have the right to do the same as America. Why, for example, should it not deploy missiles in Cuba? However, from the American perspective, installing nuclear-armed Jupiter intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in Turkey helped secure NATOs southern flank, which also helped cement relations with Turkey, and enhanced their nuclear deterrent with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union viewed these missiles and their threat very differently. Nevertheless, U.S. covert attempts to depose the Cuban regime seemed to provoke Cuban and Soviet defences and directly led to the deployment of the Soviet ballistic missiles in Cuba. It is true that American intelligence played a role in causing the Cuban Missile Crisis, and to a certain extent failed to estimate that Soviet leadership would deploy strategic missiles in Cuba. Furthermore, CIA agents in Cuba or the Soviet Union were incapable to provide solid indication of the Soviet missiles deployment. Some information was received from other Western intelligence organizations, CIA agents on the island and refugees, but little attention was given to the discovery of the missiles. The US military intelligence agencies with some support from Western allies tracked the Soviet arms shipping to Cuba. In July 1962, SlGlNT collectors listened to the radio messages to and from the Soviet vessels on their way to Cuba. These messages are interpreted and provided some indication about how Soviet vessels calling on Cuban ports were making false port declarations and declaring less than the known cargo-carrying capacity (Carrying heavy military weapons) , but no real conside ration is given due to insufficient evident. Satellite photographic reconnaissance was not directed against Cuba in 1962. On August 29th a U-2 spy-plane on reconnaissance over Cuba, brought back evidence that SA-2 surface-to-air (SAM) missiles has been installed around San Cristobal, but Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin advised President Kennedys closest advisor, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, that the installations were entirely defensive in nature. American intelligence (COMOR-The interagency Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance) decided to send another U-2 spy-plane to take a closer look, but bad weather delayed the fight until October 14th. On September 19th, 1962 American estimators issued Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE 85-3-62) on The Military Build-up in Cuba but failed to estimate what the Soviet Union would do, based on insufficient evidence, Soviet intentions, and the past Soviet behaviour. In fact, Soviet intelligence performed better in the pre-crisi s period, and they were able to transport nearly 50,000 Soviet troops, 100 tactical nuclear weapons, possibly four to six nuclear naval mines and 60 nuclear warheads for the surface-to-surface missile sites in Cuba via covert action. The American Intelligence Role during the Cuban Missile Crisis For the United States, the crisis began on October 15, 1962, when photographs from a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft revealed several SS-4 nuclear missiles at San Cristobal, Cuba. The early morning of October 16th, President John Kennedy was informed of the missile installations. Kennedy immediately convened his Executive Committee (EX-COMM), a group of his twelve most important advisors (Such as CIA Director John McCone, Secretary of Defence Robert S. McNamara, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy) to handle the unfolding crisis. During the crisis, US intelligence was able to accurately identify the location, operational status of the missile deployment, provision of MiG-21 fighters, SA-2 antiaircraft missile systems, 11-28 light bombers, missile torpedo boats, and coastal defence cruise missiles, and the numbers of these systems. Furthermore, low level reconnaissance allowed discovering the additional military forces, in particular four Soviet augmented ground force regiments, each with 31 tanks, and with six to eight Luna rocket artillery launchers It can be seen that PHOTOINT (currently called Imint- Imaging Intelligence) or aerial reconnaissance really played a vital role in Cuban Missile Crisis. Photoreconnaissance Intelligence had done an incredible job by providing credible evidence of offensive missiles in Cuba (see pictures 1 to 3 on last page of this document, taken from U-2 spy-plane during Cuban Missile Crisis) and helped policy makers and their advisors to make decisions based on solid photograph ic evidence. As McCone indicated, aerial photography was our best means of establishing hard [firm] intelligence HUMIT was also used by interviewing refugees, collecting reports from CIA agents on island, and Soviet secret from Soviet Officer Oleg Penkovsky. American military personnel interrogated unverified refugees from Cuba on American soil, who revealed that they had personally seen a convoy of SS-4 missiles near Havana. But this was not itself sufficient due to the mass of other invalid reports during or before the crisis period. Many reports are provided from agents on the Island about suspicious military movement, possible missiles and other defensive activities in Cuba. Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, a Soviet Military Intelligence officer, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and British intelligence (MI-6), all suggested that the Soviets were attempting to put missiles into Cuba but this information was not given credibility until it was subsequently confirmed through aerial reconnaissance. Oleg Penkovsky supplied 111 exposed rolls of film, 99 percent of which were legible. An estimated 10, 000 pages of intelligence reports were produced from his information, which included the top secret operating manuals for the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. Information from Penkovsky-provided documents was compared with the U-2 photography, and analysts were able to identify positively the specific missiles being placed in Cuba and determine on a daily basis the stage of construction of each missile site. This information was critical in enabling the President to know how much time he had to determine and apply a policy of diplomatic and military pressure against Khrushchev before having to take direct military action. Colonel Oleg Penkovskys role in the Cuban missile crisis has been portrayed as of pre-eminent importance to the outcome, and described as Humints best source of information during the crisis. It is true that SIGINT provided no warning of the presence of Soviet nuclear-armed intermediate and medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba prior to their discovery by U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. The Oxford, officially known as a Technical Research Ship (TRS), proved to be the largest producer of SIGINT during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The collected communications from SIGINT provided a great quantity of information which, when combined with the photographs from the U2 over-flights, provided a very good picture of what was happening in Cuba. SIGINT also helped during the midst of the crisis, to intercept and triangulate messages and sent to the Command Centre for interpretation, then used by the US government to make further decision and predict future actions of the Soviet Union and Cuba. Another type of intelligence that was used for the first time was the SOSUS (underwater sound surveillance system). SOSUS plus patrol aircraft was extensively and successfully used during the Cuban Missile Crisis and proved to be an important aspect of U.S intelligence in detecting any possible Soviet submarine movement (especially Soviet Foxtrot class submarines). à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ªAfter analyzing all the evidence from different sources of the intelligence and having an intense policy debate with the Executive Committee group members, Kennedy imposed a naval quarantine around Cuba. On October 22, Kennedy publicly announced the discovery of the ballistic missile installations and his decision to quarantine (blockade) the island to prevent Soviet ships from carrying further missile equipment to the island. He also proclaimed that any nuclear missile launched from Cuba would be regarded as an attack on the United States by the Soviet Union and demanded that the Soviets remove all of their offensive weapons from Cuba. Later, on the 26th EX-COMM heard from Khrushchev that the Soviets agreed to remove the ballistic missiles from Cuba, if the U.S. would guarantee not to invade Cuba. On October 27th, tension increased when a U-2 was shot down over Cuba and Khrushchev demanded the removal of U.S. missiles in Turkey in exchange for Soviet missiles in Cuba. But Attorney General Robert Kennedy suggested ignoring the second letter and contacted Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to tell him of the U.S. agreement with the first (not to invade Cuba). Finally, on October 28th, Khrushchev announced that he would dismantle the installations and return the missiles to the Soviet Union. Further negotiations were held to implement the October 28 agreement and it continued in November. Again American intelligence helped to provide evidence to the American government that the Soviets turned their ships back, a fact first learned from SIGINT from radio messages, and soon the Soviets dismantled and withdrew the missil es. The U.S. Navy also played a pivotal role in this crisis, demonstrating the critical importance of naval forces to national defence. Surface and submarine units moved into place to attack any ship crossing the declared line in the quarantine operation. A week of intensive face-off and direct communications between President Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev finally made it possible to alleviate the crisis. The American government and the Communist Bloc both considered the crisis over. Conclusion In summary, Espionage has been, and always be a central source of information to support national defense. The performance of US intelligence in the Cuban Missile Crisis was generally good, in some respects outstanding, albeit with a few shortcomings. From the beginning, American Intelligence made all possible efforts to collect, analyze and monitor the Soviet activities and arms build-up in Cuba, but erroneously underestimated the Soviet leaders intention to station nuclear weapons in Cuba. Moreover, the use of U-2 aircraft for aerial photoreconnaissance over the interior of Cuba, Cuban refugee interrogations, and Soviet secrets (manuals for the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles) provided by Penkovskys espionage, gave the U.S. excellent intelligence coverage of the status of missile site construction and readiness. American intelligence community worked well during the crisis, and helped policy makers, senior intelligence estimators and analyst to make better decisions and evaluate Soviet reac tions based on intelligence-provided evidence. The CIA played a leading role in backing up the EXComm. Intelligence organizations of the army, navy, and air force provided backup to the military planners. Overall, American Intelligence role in Cuban Missile Crisis was good and helped government to resolve crisis.

Im Going to College Essay -- College Admissions Essays

I'm Going to College Neither my grandmother, nor any of my great aunts, went on to college.   It was too expensive for their family.   My great Aunt Nancy, however, did try to take night classes at the University Extension, which was held at her high school.   Unfortunately, she was unable to continue paying for these classes, so she left the University Extension program with only twelve credits earned. Aunt Nancy just continued to work at the job she acquired, right out of high school, and work her way up through the ranks at this job.   There was no push by her parents to continue her education, and therefore, there was no pressure on her to attend college.   Aunt Nancy had once told me, "There is great value in a college education, for career purpose.   It is so necessary now, where as years ago it was not as essential."   She also explained to me that college can help to build better social skills, which will be used in everyday life.   Now that Aunt Nancy is retired, she reads a lot.   When she was younger, her mother only took her to the city library three times a year to get books to read.   So, as a child she did not read as much as she reads now.   While in school, she only preformed the necessary reading and writing that was required.   Now, she reads the newspaper, books, or a magazine almost everyday.   My mother, on the other hand, did attend college.   Actually, she has attended college twice now.   The first time she went, she gained a degree as a Medical Laboratory Technician.   Later in life, she went back to college and attained her accounting degree.   My mother decided that she was not happy as a Medical Technician, so she wanted to go back to school to learn of what fields would interest her... ...of reading to your children.   He explained that as long as you read to your child, or as long as they are reading to themselves, it would increase your child's comprehension skills.   At this point in time, I no longer enjoyed having my mother read to me, but I was reading books to myself so I was still learning and establishing the proper skills gained through reading and writing. Books and an education seem to be important to everyone, no matter how old or young.   I have learned many things both in school and just by reading.   Obviously, books and schooling can have the same effect on others.   College is a time to grow, both intellectually and socially.   I strongly encourage future generations to attend college and get a good education throughout life.   It will prove to be extremely beneficial, and you will learn a lot about yourself in the process.

The Use of Force :: essays research papers

The doctor in "The Use of Force" is very unprofessional. He describes the patient in a very infatuated way. The doctor also abhors the way the parents of the patient referred to him. And the doctor treats the patient aggressively. From the moment the doctor enters the house. He introduces the girl to us in an infatuated sense. He saw her as a "very attractive little thing" and he described her to have "magnificent blonde hair†¦ one of those picture children often reproduced in advertising leaflets and the photogravure sections of the Sunday papers." Throughout the process of the examination we see that he "had already fallen in love with the savage brat.† The doctor forces the examination on the girl for the sense of self-enjoyment. As he said, "it was a pleasure to attack her." The doctor seemed very unprofessional when he detested the way the mother, referred to him. When the mother told her daughter that he is a â€Å"nice man† and that he won't hurt her, he became very impatient and mad. This is very ironic because all parents usually tell their kids that doctors are nice people. Why did he become angry with that comment? Ironically enough, doctors are supposed to be nice to their patients and the parents of the patients, at least the professional ones. Doctors are usually extra tolerant towards kids, and are trained to handle kids like this specific patient, who do not wish to cooperate. In attempt to examine the patient, the doctor acted extremely unprofessionally. The doctor was very forceful and harsh. When the young patient wouldn’t allow the doctor to look into her throat, the doctor forced the wooden tongue depressor between her teeth, and the patient broke the tongue depressor. The doctor at that point had become violent, and decided upon continuing the examination with additional power towards the young patient. While the young patients’ mouth was bleeding because of the broken wooden depressor, the doctor forced the handle of a smooth metal spoon into the patient’s mouth.

To what extent was the Crimean War (1853 †1856) ‘disastrously planned and poorly executed’ (Economist 2014)

Introduction This essay examines the claim that the Crimean War (1853-1856) was ‘disastrously planned and poorly executed’ (Economist 2014). The first section looks at the circumstances out of which the war arose, providing some background to the conflict while suggesting that from its inception the war was characterised by errors in judgment and miscommunication. The next section proceeds to discuss the many naval blunders that took place during the war, looking both at the Crimea as well as the less commonly discussed Far East. This is followed by a consideration of the land operations of the conflict, paying particular attention to actions of the British. The analysis then turns to the provisioning of the Allied and Russian forces, as well as the quality of services such as medical care. Finally, the last section briefly considers the consequences of the war for the parties involved. It is concluded that the Crimean War was characterised by an unusually large number of errors in t erms of planning and execution. Poor planning and organisation can arguably be seen from the outbreak of war. The desire to access the Mediterranean had been a long-standing ambition of Russia’s by the mid-19th century (Economist 2014; Lambert 2011). Thus the weakness of the Ottoman Empire in the period was seized upon, partially concealed, of course, by excuses about the persecution of Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire. The backdrop to this was a broader dispute about who should rule the Holy Land: Orthodox Russia or Catholic France (Clough 1964). The Turkish-Russian dispute included several lacklustre, abortive attempts at peaceful resolution through diplomacy, after which the Russian Army invaded Moldavia and Wallachia (parts of modern-day Moldova and Romania) on 2 July 1853, sinking the Turkish fleet at Sinope in 1853. This was followed by a Turkish declaration of war on 5 October of the same year (Economist 2014). However, the actions of Russia were to an extent the result of a miscalculation. In spite of a caustic public reaction in Britain and France, the Allied response to the invasion was a cautious one to begin with, characterised by dithering, uncertain diplomacy (Economist 2014). This ‘misled Russia into believing that it could continue its aggression against the Ottomans without consequences’, and Britain and France unexpectedly declared war in March 1854 (Economist 2014). The conflict then escalated when the Kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont joined the war against Russia the following year. A degree of poor coordination and misunderstanding can therefore be seen from the outset. For Britain and France, this took the form of confused, uncertain policy; for Russia, it was a misinterpretation of the likelihood that other parties would join the war (Lambert 2011). Clough (1964: 917) makes this point succinctly, arguing that war arose from ‘Napoleon’s search for presti ge; Nicholas’s quest for control over the Straits; his naive miscalculation of the probable reaction of the European powers; the failure of those powers to make their position and the pressure of public opinion in Britain and Constantinople at crucial moments’. For Clough (1964), therefore, the war was a disorganised, poorly planned shambles from the very beginning. It was the product not only of confusion but also of the hubris and inflated ambitions of the leaders of Europe at the time. It seems probable that the war arose out of somewhat chaotic circumstances and was therefore tainted from the start, but the question of whether this pattern continued remains. The actual combat side of the war appears to have been shambolic in many cases. This is suggested by the first events of the war. Despite being unyielding in the face of Russian aggression, it seems that Turkey was not prepared for the eventuality of conflict (Economist 2014; Bloy 2002a). When the Russian fleet arrived off Sinope on the southern coast of the Black Sea, the Turkish Admiral was unprepared for battle. His squadron was relatively weak, consisting of only 6 frigates, 3 corvettes, and two small paddle steamers. Additionally, his largest guns were only 24-pounders, and his troops were poorly trained and unready for war. By comparison, the Russian fleet under Admiral Nakhimov was ‘vastly superior in numbers, size and gunpower’ (Brown 1989). The full extent of the imbalance is revealed by the fact that with the exception of one ship the entire Turkish fleet, including 3000 sailors, was destroyed, with the Russians suffering negligible losses. The Turks were not prepared to defend their territories, and probably did not have the ability to do so in any case (Brown 1989). The dramatic outcome of this conflict was a great shock. Few in the navy or elsewhere had anticipated the devastating effect of shells on wooden ships, and as Brown (1989) notes, ‘Naval and public opinion showed surprise, shock and horror at the casualties’. Therefore, even at this early there is evidence of poor preparation and a lack of understanding of how the war would be conducted on the part of the Turks if not the Russians. The same cannot quite be said of the British and French. While many critics expressed shock at the event of Sinope, preparations had been made. The British had tested shells against the Prince George and the French had done likewise at Garve. Moreover, in response to the success of the Russian navy the French began the construction of heavily fortified armament batteries for coastal attack. That this was prior to the declaration of war suggests a degree of naval preparation on the part of the Allies (Lambert 2011). Nevertheless, there were serious shortcomings with the British fleet in particular that suggest both poor execution and planning. In the first place, it was wrongly believed that the Russian Baltic fleet might invade the United Kingdom, which turned out to be unjustified and stalled operations for over a year (Brown 1989). This was a strategic error and what it suggests about execution and planning can be debated. Additionally, when the British fleet went into the conflict it had problems with manpower. For example, admirals were promoted by seniority, which meant they tended to be older than was desirable. More importantly, many vessels were undermanned due to the poor pay and conditions on ships. When Britain declared war these problems had yet to be resolved, which indicates a distinct lack of preparedness (Brown 1989). In recent decades it has been argued by historians that Britain was guilty of extremely poor naval strategy, which would amount to a poor execution of the war on their part. Lambert (1990, cited in Fuller 2014) is among the most famous to put forward this thesis. He argued that ‘the real war could have been decided†¦in the Baltic, and won by the full might of a modern maritime power against a continental one’ (Fuller 2014: 2). When the strength of the British navy at this time, in terms of size and technology, is considered, this argument seems like a strong one. The British navy was notably ahead of its counterparts insofar as it included large numbers mortar vessels and ironclad batteries. Lambert believed that Cronstadt would definitely have fallen to the heavily armed British flotilla, and that the Russian realisation of this fact what forced peace in the end (Fuller 2014). Perhaps, then, the failure of the British to fully utilise its navy’s potential in the Baltic amounts to a strategic blunder. It is doubtful, however, that this part of the war was as poorly executed as Lambert argued. As Fuller (2014) notes, unilateral action (the so-called ‘Great Armament’) against Cronstadt might have alienated the French, who were on poor terms with the British. It might also have driven up the cost of the war to unsustainable levels, stretching the economy to breaking point. This much is suggested by a review in 1856 of the ‘Great Armament’, which noted that Britain could not provide any ‘proof of unabated strength and unexhausted resources’ (Fuller 2014: 38). This warning was echoed by Sir George Cornewall Lewis, Chancellor of the Exchequer in Palmerston’s ministry, who expressed concern that ‘our financial prospect is very bad, a declining revenue, rising prices, a large loan wanted which will be got on bad terms, and more money lent to Sardinia and Turkey’ (Fuller 2014: 38). The so-called missed opportunities in the Baltic, therefore, do not suggest poor planning and execution. Nevertheless, one might make the case that the poor financial prospect of Britain by the end of the war suggests a lack of preparation. Another line of argument, directed once again at the British, focuses on naval operations in the Pacific. Stephan (1969: 257), for example, describes the ‘tragi-comic nature of tactical operations in the Far East’. He notes that despite the overwhelming superiority of the Allied naval forces in around China and the Pacific, almost no headway was made in that sphere. Indeed, the Allies had twenty five ships of war, including six steamers, while the Russians could muster only six which were later reduced to four (Stephan 1969). Poor execution and planning in this case manifested in two ways. In the first place, there was little coordination between the China and Pacific squadrons and the British and French fleets in the area. As Stephan (1969: 258) notes, ‘at the outbreak of war†¦the British Commander-in-Chief of the China Squadron, Rear Admiral Sir James Stirling, was sailing from Singapore to Hong Kong. The rest of the squadron lay scattered among the Chinese treaty ports such as Shanghai, Amoy, and Canton.’ This arose from the folly of dividing command of the fleet, as well as a lack of information about the location of both friend and foe. Indeed, Stephan (1969) suggests that Stirling (who rather tellingly was only appointed Commander-in-Chief on 4 March), probably did not even know the location of Russian warships. There is relatively clear evidence that naval operations were fairly shambolic on the part of both the British and the French. The same is true of events on land. The Battle of the River Alma on 20 Sept 1984, for example, saw the British forces charge headlong against a fortified Russian position, the result of a ‘lack of information and lack of reconnoitre’ which meant that a number of easier routes went undiscovered. The British forces only triumphed because such an imprudent move was considered too unlikely to prepare against. The aftermath, moreover, saw poor execution insofar as the cavalry did not pursue the routing Russians, allowing them instead to fortify Sevastopol and thus draw out the war. This was further compounded when disagreements between the French and British commanders delayed the march to Sevastopol by several weeks, after which the city was heavily defended. The most famous of the blunders was, of course, the Charge of Light Brigade during the Battl e of Balaclava on 25 Oct 1854, in which a brigade of 670 cavalry under Lord Cardigan attacked an extremely heavily fortified Russian redoubt. The now famous calamity during which much of the Light Brigade was destroyed was the product of a simple miscommunication but reflects deeper issues with the British forces related to internal divisions, inexperience, and the unwillingness to question absurd orders. All of this translates to poor execution in warfare. In examining the conduct and organisation of the war more generally it is obvious that there was little sophisticated coordination or planning (Sweetman 2001). At every level of the Allied war effort this was true. Within the British army, for example, the artillery and engineers were commanded by the Master-General of Ordinance while the infantry and cavalry were commanded by the Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards, Lord Raglan, which made coordinated planning difficult (Sweetman 2001). Then, of course, the Royal Navy was a separate branch of the military, answerable only to the Lords of the Admiralty. This chaotic set-up hindered the Allied offensive at Sevastopol, as Raglan could not coordinate the British forces on land and sea without undertaking time-consuming and inefficient communications (Sweetman 2001). This is not to mention the fact that there was no overall commander with the authority to coordinate the various national armies of each Allied nation, as had been the ca se during the Peninsula War with the Duke of Wellington. Thus, ‘the entire ramshackle structure palpably lacked coordination’, and it is important to appreciate ‘the constraints that this put on drawing up strategic plans or executing tactical operations’ (Sweetman 2001: 16). The Russians were less culpable in these terms, although there were many shortcomings in their preparations. Urry (1989) has noted how the Russian land forces suffered severely from poor provisioning, something which became particularly damaging in the summer of 1854. By September, there were 50, 000 Russian troops in the Crimean Peninsula, but the Provisions’ Commission was comparatively small and badly managed. Place this in the geographical context and it appears even more serious. Most of the Crimea was barren and sparsely populated, which meant that the troops and animals in the region were more reliant on their supply chain than usual (Urry 1989). The infrastructure necessary to support the Russian war effort was also inadequate in many cases. Roads were of poor quality and transport networks were badly run and unreliable, which contributed to the problem of supplying the troops. Even those supplies that did arrive had often spoiled because of the excessive time it took to transport goods. This situation was improved somewhat when the new Russian Commander, General Prince M. D. Gorchakov, saw the reorganisation of the supply system, but much of the damage was already done (Urry 1989; Curtiss 1979). This is a clear example of poor preparation on the part of the Russians. Poor planning in terms of supplies was also a major problem for the Allies. The most striking example of this occurred on 14 November 1854 when a ‘Great Storm’ sunk 30 ships in Balaclava harbour and destroyed ?3 million worth of supplies, coinciding with the onset of the harsh winter. The Allies, however, had only prepared for a summer campaign, and the results were catastrophic. As Bloy (2002a) put it: ‘The Allies†¦had to make do with summer equipment: tents, light clothes and so on. It took months to re-supply them. Men died of exposure, disease, starvation.’ The situation was compounded by poor organisation and management in the aftermath, as well as the natural barriers of substandard roads and communication networks (Bloy 2002a). As poor as the organisational side of the war was for all sides, the Russian war effort was comparatively impressive. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the Russian were operating under very difficult conditions. Firstly, the defence of Sevastopol was an inherently problematic affair. The size of Russia required a wide distribution of troops, especially in the Baltic to prevent the Allies landing there (Urry 1989). Then there was uncertainty regarding the neutrality of Prussia, and especially Austria, which meant that troops had to be stationed along Russia’s lengthy western border. The barren nature of much of the Russian territory, moreover, especially in the south, was an unfortunate barrier that hampered supply, communication, and the movement of troops (Urry 1989). As Urry (1989) argues, these factors contributed to difficulties experienced by the Russians, and in many cases even good preparation and execution would have made it difficult to overcome such facto rs. On the other, one might argue that the decision to start a war in the face of so many natural barriers should be regarded as a major strategic failure (Jones 2013; Bloy 2002a). One area in which all parties lacked planning was medical provision. The low quality of care afforded to wounded soldiers in British hospitals has become notorious primarily because of Florence Nightingale’s work as Scutari. The quality of French medical care was supposedly slightly better, as is attested by William Howard Russell: ‘Here the French are greatly our superiors. Their medical arrangements are extremely good†¦ and they have the help of the Sisters of Charity†¦. These devoted women are excellent nurses.’ Nevertheless, even this relied on volunteers (Curtiss 1966: 98). The Russians likewise had to rely on volunteers, who operated under the aegis of the Exaltation of the Cross (Curtiss 1966). Testimony from the brace medical volunteers in the Russians forces reveals the shoddy set-up in place, especially with regard to the convoy system designed to transport wounded soldiers. This was supposedly poorly supplied with blankets, had few good driver s, and little in the way of food and water (Curtiss 1979; Curtiss 1966). The Crimean War was concluded peacefully at the Treaty of Paris on 30 March 1856 after the fall of Sevastopol, probably to the advantage of all parties. The conflict itself was of little obvious benefit to any nation, with the possible exception of Turkey, which had captured possessions restored to it by Russia (Bloy 2002a; Seton-Watson 1988). In turn, regions captured by the Allies, such as Sevastopol and Balaclava, were restored. Territories were thus redistributed to the participants in much the same way as before the war had begun. One of the most important effects of war was that it prohibited both Turkey and Russia from establishing a naval or military arsenal on the Black Sea, which weakened the Russian position. However, this turned out to be unenforceable and a few decades later Russia had violated the agreement (Gorizontov 2012; Seton-Watson 1988). The conflict did have important long-term implication insofar as it permanently weakened the position of Tsarist Russia, and sa w the ascendency of the France as the preeminent power in Europe. It therefore saw the end of the Concert of Europe, the balance of power that had existed since the Congress of Vienna in 1815 (Bloy 2002a, 2002b). In conclusion, the Crimean War was both poorly planned and poorly executed. This essay has outlined the numerous strategic, tactical, and logistical failures perpetrated by all sides, but especially by the Allies and Britain in particular. However, as important as these moments were in defining the nature of the conflict and solidifying its reputation, it was problematic from the outset. As Clough (1964: 917) puts it: ‘it was not the result of a calculated plan, nor even of hasty last-minute decisions made under stress. It was the consequence of more than two years of fatal blundering in slow-motion by inept statesmen who had months to reflect upon the actions they took.’ Ultimately, while there are many mitigating factors, moments of triumph, and cases of heroism and coordination – especially in the medical sphere – this is a reputation well-deserved. References Bloy, M. (2002a) The Crimean War: ‘Britain in Blunderland’, The Victorian Web http://www.victorianweb.org/history/crimea/blunder2.html [Retrieved 10/06/2014] Bloy, M. (2002b) The Crimean War: comment on attitudes in Britain, The Victorian Web http://www.victorianweb.org/history/crimea/attitude.html [Retrieved 10/06/2014] Brown, D. K. (1989) The Royal Navy in the Crimean War: Technological Advances http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/showthread.php?t=14517 [Retrieved 04/06/2014] Clough, S. B., ed. (1964) A History of the Western World. Boston, Heath: University of Michigan Press Curtiss, J. S. (1979) Russia’s Crimean War, Durham, N.C: Duke University Press Curtiss, J. S. (1966) Russian Sisters of Mercy in the Crimea, 1854-1855, Slavic Review, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 84-100 Fuller, H. J. (2014) Could Have, Would Have, Should HaveEngland’s ‘Great Armament’ during the Crimean War, the proposed naval assault upon Cronstadt’s defences and the Peace of 1856: Re-examining the evidence, University of Wolverhampton Gorizontov, L. E. (2012) ‘The Crimean War as a Test of Russia’s Imperial Durability’, Russian Studies in History 51 (1), pp. 65–94 Jones, H. P. (2012) Southern Military Interests in the Crimean War, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 25, pp. 35–52 Lambert, A. (2011) The Crimean War: British Grand Strategy against Russia, 1853–56, Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Seton-Watson, H. (1988) The Russian Empire 1801–1917. Oxford: Clarendon Press Stephan, J. J. (1969) The Crimean War in the Far East, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 257-277 Sweetman, J. (2001) The Crimean War: 1854-1856, Oxford: Osprey Publishing The Economist (May 2014) What the original Crimean war was all about, Economist http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/03/economist-explains-5 [Retrieved 11/06/2014] Urry, J. (1989) Mennonites and the Crimean War, 1854 – 1856, Journal of Mennonite Studies, Vol. 7, pp.10-32